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Abstract: Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion:
people’s judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are
pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the
‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion.
Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people’s attributions
of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative assessments, but rather
by attributions of underlying values and characterological dispositions to the agent. In a
second study, we examined people’s judgments about what they think drives asymmetric
intuitions in the Chairman case and found that people are highly inaccurate in identifying
which features of the case their intuitions track. In the final part of the paper, we discuss
how the statistical methods used in this study can help philosophers with the critical
features problem, the problem of figuring out which among the myriad features present
in hypothetical cases are the critical ones that our intuitions are responsive to. We show
how the methods used in this study have some advantages over both armchair methods
used by traditional philosophers and survey methods used by experimental philosophers.
Introduction
A chairman is approached by his assistant and told about a new program they
are thinking of starting that will help profits and harm the environment. The
Chairman replies, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment, I just want
to make as much profit as I can’. So the Chairman starts the program, and sure
enough, the environment was harmed. Did the Chairman intentionally harm the
environment? Most people say yes. However, when the same case is presented
with the word ‘harm’ replaced by the word ‘help’, most people say the Chairman
did not intentionally help the environment. Notice the two cases appear similar
in all respects but for the different moral and evaluative responses they elicit (for
example, typically, harming the environment is viewed as bad while helping the
environment is viewed as good). Based on the Chairman case, and a number of
cases in the literature much like it, many philosophers and psychologists have
reached the somewhat surprising conclusion that normative factors pervasively
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influence judgments of intentionality (Doris et al., 2007; Knobe, 2003, 2005, 2006;
Mele, 2006; Nadelhoffer, 2004a and b, 2006; Alicke, 2008; Wright and Bengson,
2009; Holton, 2010). While substantial disagreement remains about which specific
normative factors are at work, the minimal thesis that some normative factor or other
exerts effects on intentionality judgments is now not much in dispute. Reporting
on the widespread consensus, Joshua Knobe, the philosopher who originated
the Chairman case, writes, ‘At this point, there can be little doubt that moral
considerations have an impact on people’s use of the word ‘‘intentionally’’. The key
remaining questions are about how this effect is to be understood’ (Knobe, 2006).
In this paper, we aim to investigate the factors that drive judgment in the
Chairman case using methods quite different than those used in prior studies. In
Part 1 of the paper, we report on a novel empirical study that uses a statistical
method called structural path analysis. A key advantage of this method is that it allows
multiple factors associated with different models of intentionality judgments to be
quantified and directly compared against each other (see Sinnott-Armstrong et al.,
2008 for an application of structural modeling methods to understanding factors
influencing judgement in Trolley Problems). Using structural path modeling, we
show that normative factors are in fact unlikely to play a substantial role in driving
people’s divergent judgments in the Chairman case. We show the evidence instead
supports an alternative view, based on an existing model called the Deep Self
Concordance Model (Sripada, 2010), which holds that asymmetric judgments are
significantly driven by assessments of the Chairman’s underlying values, attitudes,
and stable behavioral dispositions. But over and above our partisan defense of our
favored Deep Self Concordance Model of intentionality judgments, a key theme in
this part of the paper is methodological: we aim to illustrate the method of structural
path modeling and point out ways that it can supplement existing methods used by
philosophers, both of the traditional and the experimental variety.
In Part 2, we report on the results of a second study in which participants
were presented with both versions of the Chairman case and asked what explains
asymmetric intentionality judgments. Results showed that people’s ‘tracking judg-
ments’, i.e. their intuitive judgments about what features of cases their intuitions
are responding to, are highly inaccurate. By a very large margin, the very normative
factors that we showed in our first study are not driving asymmetric judgments in
the Chairman case are overwhelmingly cited by people as explaining why people
make asymmetric judgments.
Why are people’s tracking judgments so inaccurate? Our explanation, in abbre-
viated form, goes as follows: Differences in normative features between the two
versions of the Chairman case are highly salient and readily accessible to awareness.
But the actual processes that underpin judgments of intentional action are not so
readily accessible. These processes operate mostly outside conscious awareness and
track features of cases that cannot easily be introspected. So when asked to furnish
an explanation for divergent judgments of intentional action in the Chairman
case, it is not surprising that people focus on normative features that are salient
and consciously apparent, even if these features are not what actually drive their
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judgments. We call the preceding explanation of why people focus on norma-
tive factors in explaining the Chairman asymmetry the ‘Telling more than we
know’ explanation, in homage to Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson’s famous
1977 paper in psychology that drew early attention to a broadly similar set of
phenomena.
In the final part of the paper, we explore how the experimental and statistical
methods used in this paper may be more generally applied by philosophers. Here
we argue that standard methods of philosophical inquiry demand that philosophers
solve the ‘critical features problem’, the problem of figuring out which among
the myriad features present in hypothetical cases are the critical ones that drive
our intuitive responses. Given inaccuracies in people’s tracking judgments, we
argue that structural path modeling and related statistical techniques have an
especially useful role to play in helping philosophers solve the critical features
problem.
Because we seek to reach an audience mainly of philosophers who may be
unfamiliar with structural path modeling, we present our main results in informal
language and place more technical details in footnotes. In addition, we offer extra
explanatory material throughout to aid understanding of our methods. Our hope is
that by introducing a wide philosophical audience to structural path modeling and
related methods, others may perhaps learn more about these methods and apply
these methods to other philosophical questions.
1. What Drives Asymmetric Intuitions in the Chairman Case?
A Structural Path Analysis
1.1 Study Vignettes and Questions
In order to investigate the basis of asymmetric intuitions in the Chairman case, we
conducted a study in which 240 University of Michigan undergraduates completed
a brief survey. Participants (n = 120) in the ‘harm’ condition read the following
paragraph.
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said,
‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but
it will also harm the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new
program.’
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.
Participants in the ‘help’ condition (n = 120) read an identical paragraph, but the
word ‘harm’ was replaced with the word ‘help’.
Most studies of the Chairman case ask participants the question: Did the
Chairman harm [help] the environment intentionally? They then go on to compare
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Table 1 Questions used in the study. Participants answered by placing an ‘X’ on a seven point scale
below each question.
the proportion of participants who say ‘yes’ to this question in the harm condition
against the proportion saying ‘yes’ in the help condition. In the present study,
in addition to asking a similar question about intentionality (the precise wording
is found in Table 1), we asked participants five additional questions designed
to measure key candidate explanatory variables that might be driving people’s
judgments (Table 1). The order of presentation of all questions was systematically
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varied to mitigate potential order effects (120 counterbalanced orders were used in
the harm condition as well as the help condition).1
1.2 The Candidate Models
The questions in Table 1 were used in order to test a number of candidate models for
explaining asymmetric judgments of intentionality in the Chairman case (Table 2).
The first model is the ‘Good/Bad Model’, which was initially proposed by Joshua
Knobe (Knobe, 2005, 2006). Though Knobe no longer subscribes to the model
(Knobe’s current model is discussed and tested in Section 1.4), the Good/Bad
Model has been influential in the literature in recent years and continues to be
explicitly endorsed (e.g. Beebe and Buckwalter, 2010), or implicitly assumed by a
number of writers, and thus warrants continued scrutiny and testing. According to
the Good/Bad Model, people’s intentionality judgments are strongly influenced by
the evaluative valence of the outcome brought about by the agent. That is, people
are much more willing to say an agent brought about an outcome intentionally if
they view the outcome as bad compared to when they view the outcome as good.
Applying this model to the Chairman case, the outcome of the environment’s
being harmed is viewed as bad in the harm condition, but the outcome of the
environment’s being helped is viewed as good in the help condition—thus resulting
in differing judgments of intentionality. Another influential model, developed by
Mark Alicke (2008, 1992), focuses not on the goodness or badness of the outcome,
but rather on the moral status of the agent. According to this ‘Moral Status
Model’, seeing an agent violate basic moral standards causes people to experience
attitudes of moral blame and moral disapproval, which in turn makes them more
likely to say the agent intentionally brought about the outcome.2 Applying this
model to the Chairman case, in the harm condition the Chairman is judged
as being an immoral person because his harming the environment violates basic
moral standards, so people are more likely to say he intentionally brought about
the outcome. In the help condition, the Chairman is judged to be an immoral
person to a much lesser extent because he does not harm the environment, so
people will be correspondingly less likely to say he intentionally brought about the
outcome—resulting in an overall asymmetry in intentionality judgments between
1 Question 4 and 6 were grouped into a single block. The block was allowed to vary in order
of presentation with respect to the other questions, but within this block, order did not vary
(Questions 4 was always asked prior to Question 6). Grouping these two questions into a
block was done for two reasons: 1) to reduce the number of counterbalanced orders to a more
manageable level. A total of five elements (four individual questions and one question block)
were counterbalanced, so there were 120 orders (representing all possible orders of these five
elements) in the harm condition as well as the help condition; and 2) Questions 4 and 6 had
very similar wording, and it was thought that presenting them next to each other would
enhance participants’ ability to rapidly see how the two questions differed.
2 Thomas Nadelhoffer has put forward an interesting model that in some ways is closely related
to the Moral Status Model. We discuss his model in detail in Appendix A.
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Model Author
Explanatory Variable(s)
(measured in this study)
associated with each model
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Table 2 Summary of the models of intentionality judgments tested in this study.
the two conditions.3 We measured the predictions of the Good/Bad Model and
Moral Status Model (which we often refer to together as ‘normative factor models’)
with questions 2 and 3, respectively (Table 1).
Another model we sought to test is the Deep Self Concordance Model. This
model is more complex and is explained in depth in another paper (Sripada, 2010),
so here we keep our explanation brief. According to the Deep Self Concordance
Model, many factors play a role in influencing intentionality judgments, but an
underappreciated factor is whether the outcome the agent brings about concords
with the agent’s underlying core values, attitudes, and behavioral dispositions, which
constitute the agent’s ‘Deep Self’. The Deep Self Concordance Model differs from
normative factor models in that it focuses not on people’s evaluative judgments
of the agent, but rather on people’s ascriptions of evaluative attitudes to the agent.
Evaluative judgments of an agent and ascriptions of evaluative attitudes to an agent
have a similar ‘sound’ and they often co-occur (that is, people routinely make both
kinds of assessments simultaneously), so it is sometimes easy to get these two kinds
of assessments confused. But to understand the Deep Self Concordance Model, it
is essential to see that these two assessments are fundamentally different. If George
Bush makes a speech about his views on abortion, people will form assessments
about the descriptive question of what are Bush’s core values and attitudes towards
abortion (e.g. pro- versus anti-abortion attitudes), as well as the evaluative question
of whether Bush is moral or immoral for holding the values and attitudes that he
3 The Moral Status Model does not require that the Chairman is judged to be moral (rather than
immoral) in the help condition. It only requires that that there is a significant difference in the
degree to which he is judged to be immoral in the harm and help conditions.
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does. These two judgments regarding George Bush are fundamentally distinct, as
evidenced by the fact that most people probably agree that Bush has values and
attitudes opposed to abortion, but nevertheless there is substantial disagreement
about whether Bush is moral or immoral for holding these values and attitudes.
With these distinctions in mind, we can now see the key difference between
the Deep Self Concordance Model and normative factor models. The Deep Self
Concordance Model claims that it is descriptive judgments about the core values and
attitudes possessed by an agent (i.e. ascriptions of values and attitudes to the agent’s
Deep Self) that influence intentionality judgments. People also typically make
evaluative judgments of the agent (or the outcome that the agent brings about), but
the Deep Self Concordance Model claims that these evaluative judgments do not
influence intentionality judgments.4
Applying the Deep Self Concordance Model to the Chairman case, the model
first predicts that in both the harm and help condition, people ascribe to the
Chairman core underlying anti-environment values and attitudes. This is because
the Chairman says ‘I don’t care at all about harming [helping] the environment’,
which is taken to express contempt or hostility towards the environment. In the
harm condition, the outcome of harming the environment is concordant with the
Chairman’s underlying anti-environment attitudes, so people say the Chairman
brought about the outcome intentionally. In the help condition, the outcome
of helping the environment is discordant with the Chairman’s underlying anti-
environment attitudes so people say the Chairman did not bring about the outcome
intentionally. We measured the predictions of the Deep Concordance Self Model
in two ways. With question 4 (Table 1), we probed participants’ views about
the Chairman’s values and attitudes towards the environment. With question 6,
we probed people’s views about the generalizability of the kind of outcome the
Chairman brought about to other contexts and situations. According to the Deep
Self Concordance Model, generalizability of this sort is a characteristic feature of
the attitudes contained in an agent’s Deep Self. That is, the values and attitudes
of the Deep Self are a core and stable part of the person (i.e. they are trait-like)
and thus they dispose the person to bring about outcomes concordant with these
values and attitudes across a range of situations and contexts. For example, suppose
one person deeply values education and academic success, while another person
deeply disdains education and views it with contempt, and both do very poorly
on a particular examination. People will say that the second person, but not the
first person, is the kind of person who will, in other contexts and situations, bring
about similar outcomes, because the outcome of doing poorly on an exam concords
with the anti-education attitudes of the second person’s Deep Self, but not the
pro-education attitudes of the first person’s Deep Self. In a similar way, asking
whether the Chairman will bring about similar outcomes in other contexts and
4 The difference between the Deep Self Concordance Model and normative factor models is
also discussed at length in Sripada (2010), especially Section 3.2.
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situations provides another way to probe whether participants see the outcome
associated with the Chairman’s action as springing from the values, attitudes, and
behavioral dispositions of his Deep Self.5
We asked an additional question to probe subjects’ own values and attitudes
towards the environment (Question 6, Table 1). This question is relevant to testing
the Indirect Influence Model, which we discuss in section 1.4. Finally, questions 2
and 3, which probed people’s normative judgments of the outcome and the agent,
respectively, allowed us to perform a test of an important model of intentionality
judgments put forward by Thomas Nadelhoffer. Because of certain statistical
limitations, we could not test Nadelhoffer’s model at the same time as we tested the
other normative factor models, and thus we discuss Nadelhoffer’s model separately
in Appendix A. Overall, five candidate explanatory variables were measured, three
variables associated with various normative factor models and two associated with
the Deep Self Concordance Model. Our main question was: What are the relative
contributions of each of these candidate variables to explaining the asymmetry in
intentionality judgments in the Chairman case? Structural path analysis provides a
powerful quantitative method by which this question can be answered.
1.3 A Structural Path Analysis of Responses to the Chairman Case
In Figure 1, a structural path model6 is shown depicting relationships between the
key variables associated with our study—the ‘Case’ variable, which represents our
manipulation (presenting participants with either the harm or the help version of the
survey), the four candidate explanatory variables, and the outcome variable (levels
of agreement with the statement that the Chairman intentionally harmed [helped]
the environment). Each variable is hereafter referred to using the shorthand nota-
tions in Table 1. Paths, shown in Figure 1 as black unidirectional arrows, represent
links between these variables, and their positions correspond to our antecedent
hypothesis that Case influences the four candidate explanatory variables which in
turn influence Intentionality Judgments. An additional path links Case directly with
Intentionality Judgments. This path represents the influence of Case on Intentional-
ity Judgments that is not mediated through influences on the candidate explanatory
variables.
Paths are associated with coefficients called path coefficients. Each coefficient
represents the magnitude of the influence of the variable at the start of the path
on the variable at the end of the path, controlling for the influence of other
5 Generalizability is a characteristic feature of attitudes of the Deep Self, but not a necessary feature.
For example, the death of Moby Dick is an outcome that is strongly concordant with Captain
Ahab’s Deep Self. But it is not easy to see how Captain Ahab could bring about outcomes
like this one in other contexts and situations because Moby Dick is a single individual and his
death is an event that can only occur once.
6 All structural path analyses were performed with EQS (Multivariate Software Inc, Encino CA),
a commercially available software package for implementing structural equation modeling.
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Figure 1 Initial structural path model of four candidate variables that potentially explain the relationship
between the case manipulation and judgments of intentional action in the Chairman case. Statistically
significant paths are shown as solid arrows, while non-significant paths are shown as dashed arrows.
∗ = p < 0.05, ∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ = p < 0.001
predictor variables. More specifically, suppose the value of the path connecting
some variable ‘A’ (at the start of a path arrow) to another variable ‘B’ (at the end
of this path arrow) is p. Then the interpretation of this path coefficient is: If A is
increased by 1 unit, then B changes by p units, holding fixed the contribution of
all other variables that have paths directly connecting them to B.7 The sign of a
path coefficient reflects the direction of the influence between A and B. To ease
interpretation of Figure 1, we anchor the sign of path coefficients so that positive
numbers mean that the direction of influence along the path is that predicted by the
model associated with that path. For example, the Case → Moral Status Judgments
path is positive indicating that the prediction regarding this path by the Moral Status
Model (that people will rate the Chairman as being more immoral in the harm
7 As is common practice, path coefficients in Figures 1 and 3 are expressed in standardized units
to make comparisons between the different coefficients in the models meaningful.
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condition than in the help condition) is borne out by the data, and similarly for the
other paths in the model.8
Path coefficients are calculated by the method of maximum likelihood, an estimation
procedure with many desirable properties, and that is widely used in structural path
analysis (Bentler, 1995).9 Once path coefficients are calculated, statistical tests can
be employed to assess 1) the goodness of fit of the overall structural path model; and
2) the statistical significance of individual paths. In Figure 1, statistically significant
paths are shown with asterisks next to the path coefficient. If a path is not statistically
significant (that is, the null hypothesis that the path’s coefficient is not different than
zero cannot be rejected), then no asterisk is displayed and the path is shown as a dotted
arrow. In order to interpret path coefficients in a model, it must first be confirmed
that the model has good overall fit. Interpreting path coefficients in a model with
poor fit is akin to interpreting distances in a map that is known to be inaccurate.
The model in Figure 1 has ‘good’ fit with the data. Later, we will introduce another
model (Figure 3) with significantly better fit with the data. However, most path
coefficients in the two models are nearly identical (the difference between the two
models is that some paths have been added and other paths removed). Since it will
significantly ease exposition to first discuss the model in Figure 1, we will defer
discussion of the better fitting model (and the methods by which it was derived)
for later.
In interpreting the model in Figure 1, let us start with paths linking Case to the
four candidate explanatory variables. These paths are all solid with three asterisks
next to the path coefficients, indicating that with a very high degree of statistical
confidence, CASE does in fact influence these candidate explanatory variables.
The CASE → Goodness/Badness Judgments, CASE → Chairman Values/Attitudes
Judgments, and CASE → Generalizability Judgments paths are particularly large,
indicating that a large portion of the variation in these variables is explained by
8 The predictions of each model are discussed in section 2.2. The predictions of the Deep
Self Concordance Model require that the Chairman Values/Attitudes Judgments variable be
‘reverse coded’ in one of the two conditions. Reverse coding means that the variable is flipped
around its midpoint. Thus on a 7-point scale, a 1 is scored as a 7, a two as a 6, and so on.
Reverse coding of this variable is required for one of the two conditions because the Deep Self
Concordance Model predicts correlations of opposite directions in the two conditions. That is,
according to the Deep Self Concordance Model, in the harm condition, rating the Chairman
as more anti-environment predicts greater agreement with the statement that the Chairman
intentionality harmed the environment. But in the help condition, rating the Chairman as more
anti-environment predicts lesser agreement with the statement that the Chairman intentionally
helped the environment. The path between Case and Intentionality Judgments is positive
reflecting the ‘dummy coding’ scheme we employed in which the harm condition was coded
as ‘0’ and the help condition was coded as ‘1’.
9 All dependent variables were inspected for deviations from the normality assumptions of
maximum likelihood estimation. For all dependent variables, skewness was less than 0.5 and
kurtosis was less then 1.5. In addition, collinearity diagnostics were inspected and the presence
of multicollinearity was disconfirmed by tolerance values >0.2 and variance inflation factors
less than 4.
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Case. If we were to stop the analysis here, we would conclude that all four variables
contribute to explaining asymmetries in intentionality judgments.
However, the paths on the right side of Figure 1 linking the four candidate
explanatory variables to Intentionality Judgments suggest a quite different interpre-
tation. According to this portion of the model, Goodness/Badness Judgments and
Moral Status Judgments do not make a statistically significant contribution to Inten-
tionality Judgments. In contrast, the contributions of Chairman Values/Attitudes
Judgments and Generalizability Judgments to Intentionality Judgments are highly
statistically significant. Furthermore, Case also significantly contributes to Inten-
tionality Judgments through a direct path that represents the influence of the case
manipulation on Intentionality Judgments that is not mediated through the four
candidate explanatory variables.
Notice the pattern observed in Figure 1 in which Case is a strong predictor
of Goodness/Badness Judgments and Moral Status Judgments, but these latter
two variables are relatively weak and highly insignificant predictors of Inten-
tionality Judgments. This pattern is highly suggestive that Goodness/Badness
Judgments, Moral Status Judgments, and Intentionality Judgments all have a com-
mon cause—Case. If two variables, say Variable 1 and Variable 2 (Figure 2), are
heavily influenced by a common cause (and these variables do not otherwise causally
influence each other), the influence arising from this common cause will result in
Variable 1 and Variable 2 being strongly correlated. But this relationship is spurious.
If one controls for the variance associated with the common cause, then Variable 1
and Variable 2 should be uncorrelated (i.e. the correlation between Variable 1 and
Variable 2 should be non-significant). This is indeed the pattern we observe in our
results. The correlation between Goodness/Badness Judgments and Intentionality
Judgments is .51 (p < 0.001), and the correlation between Moral Status Judgments
and Intentionality Judgments is .18 (p = 0.005), both highly significant. But the par-
tial correlation between Goodness/Badness Judgments and Intentionality Judgments
after controlling for Case is .01 (p = 0.891),10 and the partial correlation between
Moral Status Judgments and Intentionality Judgments after controlling for Case is
.05 (p = 0.535), both non-significant. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis
that Goodness/Badness Judgments and Moral Status Judgments and Intentionality
Judgments are all causally influenced by Case, but Goodness/Badness Judgments and
Moral Status Judgments are not themselves causes of Intentionality Judgments.
In contrast, Case is a significant predictor of Chairman Values/Attitudes Judg-
ments and Generalizability Judgments, and these latter two variables remain
significant predictors of Intentionality Judgments, after controlling for the effects
of other explanatory variables including Case. This pattern of results is consistent
10 In another study of the Chairman case, Wright and Bengson (2009) also found the relationship
between judgments of the goodness or badness of the outcome and intentionality judgments
was not statistically significant after controlling for the effects of the case manipulation, lending
additional support for the similar finding in the current study.
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Figure 2 Schematic diagram of two variables influenced by a common cause. The relationship between
Variable 1 and Variable 2 is spurious
with the hypothesis that Chairman Values/Attitudes Judgments and Generalizability
Judgments are both causes of Intentionality Judgments.
Let us return to an issue that we deferred earlier—the issue of the overall
goodness of fit for a structural path model. We can assess how well a structural
path model fits with the observed data using a family of statistical measures called
goodness of fit indices.11 Using these indices, we found the model in Figure 1 has
‘good’ overall fit with the data.12 An additional tool available for the researcher
consists of modification tests that assess how the overall goodness of fit of a model
would change if new paths were added to the model and/or existing paths were
dropped from the model. Using modification tests, we found that model fit is
significantly improved if two existing paths are removed from the model and one
new path is added to the model. The two paths recommended for removal are the
Goodness/Badness Judgments → Intentionality Judgments and Moral Status Judgments →
Intentionality Judgments paths.13 The recommendation that these paths be removed
is consistent with our antecedent hypothesis that only Deep Self variables, but not
11 There are a large number of goodness of fit indices available, each emphasizing certain
dimensions of good fit. We follow published guidelines (Raykov et al., 1991) in reporting five
standard goodness of fit measures: the chi-square test, normed fit index (NFI), non-normed
fit index (NNFI), comparative fit index (CFI), and root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA).
12 X2(6, N = 240) = 12.00, p = 0.06; NFI = .985; NNFI = .981; CFI = .992; RMSEA =
.065. Using ‘rule of thumb’ cutoff values for the RMSEA (Hu and Bentler, 1999), the model
displays ‘good’ overall fit with the data. Note, the X2 test is a ‘badness of fit test’, and a
non-significant p value indicates good fit of the model to the data.
13 All modification tests were implemented in EQS (Multivariate Software Inc, Encino CA),
and decisions to add or remove paths were evaluated in light of antecedent hypotheses and
theoretical plausibility. The multivariate Wald Test (Bentler, 1995) for removing paths from the
model shows that removing the paths between the two normative variables and Intentionality
Judgments increases the overall model X2 (an index of lack of fit of the model to the data) by
2.31, which is not a statistically significant difference (p = 0.320). The resulting model shows
improvements in goodness of fit measures (such as the NNFI and RMSEA) that are sensitive
to parsimony (i.e. the number of paths in the model).
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normative variables, influence judgments of intentionality. The path recommended
for addition to the model links Goodness/Badness Judgments with Chairman
Values/Attitudes Judgments.14 This path too has antecedent theoretical justification
[for example, it has been discussed at length in prior work (Sripada, 2010)], and
we expand on the meaning of this path a bit later when we discuss the ‘Indirect
Influence Hypothesis’. The resulting model, shown in Figure 3, has near perfect fit
with the data.15
In addition to providing information about the significance of individual paths,
structural path analysis also allows calculation of mediation effects, the influence of
one variable on another that is mediated through one or more intervening variables
(Baron and Kenny, 1986). Using calculations of mediation effects,16 we found
that 55% of the influence of the case manipulation on Intentionality Judgments
is mediated through Chairman Values/Attitudes Judgments and Generalizability
Judgments, the two Deep Self variables. Just 4% of the influence of Case on Inten-
tionality Judgments is mediated through Goodness/Badness Judgments. As shown
in Figure 3, this variable influences Intentionality Judgments only indirectly by first
influencing the Deep Self Variables (i.e. through the Chairman Values/Attitudes Judg-
ments → Intentionality Judgments path). There is no effect of Case on Intentionality
Judgments that is mediated by Moral Status Judgments, as this variable does not
have any paths connecting it with Intentionality Judgments at all. These mediation
effects calculations provide us with strong evidence that at least a majority of the
asymmetry effect in intentionality judgments in the Chairman case is explained by
Deep Self variables, and normative factors play a lesser role in explaining the asym-
metry. But notice that 40% of the effect of Case on Intentionality Judgments is still
unaccounted for. This ‘unexplained variance’ of Case on Intentionality Judgments
14 The Lagrange multiplier test (Bentler, 1995) was used to identify candidate paths to be added to
the model. To avoid capitalizing on chance relationships in the data, and following a practice
recommended in the literature (Bentler, 1995), we required a more conservative threshold
for addition of new paths of p < 0.01. The Lagrange multiplier test indicates that adding a
path linking Goodness/Badness Judgments and Chairman Values/Attitudes Judgments reduces
the overall model X2 (an index of lack of fit of the model to the data) by 6.37, which is
statistically significant (p = 0.012). The direction of this path cannot be determined from our
data because the reduction in X2 is identical when a path is drawn between these variables
in either direction. Thus in Figure 3, we chose to display the path in a direction that seems
to us to be most psychologically plausible, though we cannot rule out the influence runs in
the opposite direction. Nothing of importance hangs on the question of which direction this
particular path runs.
15 X2(7, N = 240) = 7.01; p = 0.43; NFI = .991; NNFI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .002.
Using ‘rule of thumb’ cutoff values for the RMSEA (Hu and Bentler, 1999), the model displays
‘exact’ overall fit with the data.
16 The percentage of the effect of a predictor on an outcome that is mediated, sometimes referred
to as an mediation effect ratio, is defined as: (the indirect effect of the predictor on the outcome)/(the
total effect of the predictor on the outcome) (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). An indirect effect refers
to the influence of a predictor on an outcome transmitted through some third variable (the
mediator). All mediation effects were calculated using the total, direct, and indirect effect
outputs in EQS (Multivariate Software Inc, Encino CA).
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Figure 3 Final structural path model of four candidate variables that potentially explain the relationship
between the case manipulation and judgments of intentional action in the Chairman case. Statistically
significant paths are shown as solid arrows, while non-significant paths are shown as dashed arrows.
∗ = p < 0.05, ∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ = p < 0.001
can be attributed to just one of two sources. First, some unexplained variance might
be due to systematic effects of other variables that mediate the relationship between
Case and Intentionality Judgments but are not measured in the present study. These
other variables might be variables related to normative factors, Deep Self factors,
or factors unrelated to either. Alternatively, some unexplained variance might be
due to unsystematic effects (i.e. noise) associated with measurement of the variables in
the model. Of course, all variables are measured with at least some error, and this is
especially likely to be true in the current study in which all variables are measured
with just one (as opposed to multiple) ratings.17 If we (quite plausibly) suppose
that a fair portion of the remaining unexplained effect of Case on Intentionality
Judgments is due to measurement error of the candidate mediator variables, then it
17 Measuring each variable using multiple closely related ratings substantially reduces measurement
error, and will be implemented in future studies.
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follows that the Deep Self variables explain more than 55% of the asymmetry effect
in the Chairman case.
1.4 The Indirect Influence Model
But a potential alternative explanation of our results remains. It is possible that
the Deep Self Concordance Model is itself a version of a normative factor model, in
which normative factors operate indirectly to influence Deep Self-related variables.18
For example, suppose that people’s judgments of whether the Chairman is pro-
or anti-environment are significantly influenced by the person’s own values and
attitudes towards the environment. That is, people who are more pro-environment
tend to see the Chairman’s behavior as normatively inadequate, thus rating the
Chairman as more anti-environment. And, people who are more anti-environment
tend to see the Chairman’s behavior as more normatively adequate, thus rating the
Chairman as less anti-environment. If normative factors such as these influence the
variables associated with the Deep Self Concordance Model, then it can be argued
that at least part of the success of the Deep Self Concordance Model should be
attributed to normative factors, making the Deep Self Concordance Model simply
a version of a normative factor model.
We already tested one version of this Indirect Influence Model earlier when we
discussed mediation effects. There we noted that just 4% of the influence of Case on
Intentionality Judgments is accounted for by the Case → Goodness/Badness Judgments
→ Chairman Values/Attitudes Judgments → Intentionality Judgments path. Thus though
there is a statistically significant indirect effect of Goodness/Badness Judgments on
Deep Self variables, the size of this effect is rather small—roughly fourteen times
smaller than the effect of Deep Self Variables on Intentionality Judgments that is not
mediated through Goodness/Badness Judgments. We performed a second test of the
Indirect Influence Hypothesis using question 6 in Table 1, which asked participants
to rate their own values and attitudes towards the environment. The Indirect
Influence Model predicts that these Self Values/Attitudes Judgments will strongly
influence Deep Self variables. However, results showed that the correlation between
Self Values/Attitudes Judgments and Chairman Values/Attitudes Judgments was
close to zero, and was non-significant (r = 0.02, p = 0.780). A similar pattern held
for the correlation between Self Values/Attitudes Judgments and Generalizability
Judgments (r = 0.04; p = 0.580).19 This result provides strong evidence that
18 In Knobe’s latest writings, he rejects the Good/Bad Model which he originally proposed, and
formulates a new model in which moral attitudes influence intentionality judgments indirectly,
by first influencing attitude ascriptions to the agent [e.g. ‘. . .moral judgments can shift people’s
representations of an attitude along a scale from ‘con’ to ‘pro.’’ (Pettit and Knobe, 2009)]. Thus
Knobe would presumably want to endorse the Indirect Influence Model that we are presently
discussing.
19 Of note, Self Values/Attitudes Judgments were also not directly correlated with Intentionality
Judgments (r = −.03, p = 0.648).
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participants’ own values and attitudes towards the environment are not influencing
Deep Self variables, and thus not serving to indirectly influence intentionality
judgments.20
2. People’s Intuitive Explanations of Asymmetric Judgments in the
Chairman Case: The Role of Salience and Accessibility
In the previous part of the paper, we provided strong evidence that Deep Self-related
factors explain a majority of the asymmetric judgment effect in the Chairman Case,
while normative factors account for a small minority of the asymmetry. However,
based on the experience of one of us (C.S.S.) in presenting the Deep Self
Concordance Model to audiences in papers and talks, in terms of intuitive appeal,
the order of priority is fully reversed—most people find normative factor models
highly intuitive (and indeed some think it is simply obvious that these models are
correct), while they find the Deep Self Concordance Model far less intuitive. In
this part of the paper, we develop an explanation for this striking phenomenon
that though Deep Self factors actually explain the majority of the Chairman
asymmetry, people nevertheless think that the asymmetry is driven by normative
factors.
To test the hypothesis that people intuitively tend to explain the Chairman
asymmetry in terms of normative factor variables rather than Deep Self variables,
we conducted an additional study. We presented 31 undergraduates at the University
of Michigan with both the harm condition and the help condition of the Chairman
case, shown on the left and right side of a page, respectively. Below the two cases,
participants read: ‘Researchers have found that if people are presented with the case
on the left, they tend to say that the Chairman intentionally harmed the environment.
However, if people are instead presented with the case on the right, then they
tend to say the Chairman did not intentionally help the environment.’ Participants
were then asked to write a paragraph answering the question, ‘What do you think
explains why people answer differently in the two cases?’ Participants’ responses
were then coded by two undergraduate research assistants blinded to the hypothesis
of this study. Coders were presented with descriptions for the Good/Bad Model
and Moral Status Model (grouped together and labeled as a ‘Type 1 Explanation’),
and the Deep Self Concordance Model (labeled as a ‘Type 2 Explanation’), and
asked to classify whether responses corresponded to one of these two kinds of
20 In a separate study of the Chairman case, one of us (C.S.S.) asked 240 participants questions that
probed their own view of the moral status of harming the environment (7-point scale ranging
from ‘Very Moral’ to ‘Very Immoral’) as well as their agreement with the statements ‘I believe
that the environment ought to be protected’ and ‘Most people believe that the environment
ought to be protected’. Ratings did not significantly correlate with Deep Self variables (or
with intentionality judgments), providing additional evidence against various versions of the
Indirect Influence Model.
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explanations or ‘None of the Above’. Coders agreed on 24 of 31 responses, and
after being allowed to discuss codings with each other, agreed on 29 of 31 responses.
Of the 29 responses for which there was agreement, 22 responses corresponded to
a ‘Type 1’ normative factor explanation, and just 2 responses corresponded to a
‘Type 2’ Deep Self explanation, with the remaining 5 responses coded as ‘None of
the Above’.
The results of the preceding study, when combined with the results of the study
reported in Part I of the paper, provide compelling evidence that people are prone
to misidentifying the actual causes of intuitive judgment in the Chairman case. In
Part I of the paper, we showed that compared to normative factor variables, Deep
Self variables have much greater importance in driving asymmetric judgments in
the Chairman case. However, in our second study, we showed that, by a very
large margin, the very normative factors that we have shown (in Part I) are not driving
asymmetric judgments in the Chairman case are overwhelmingly cited by people
as explaining why people make asymmetric judgments.
Why are people’s explanations for the Chairman asymmetry so inaccurate? We
now sketch an account that draws heavily on the seminal work of Richard Nisbett
and Timothy Wilson, and emphasizes a critical role for salience and accessibility
in biasing people’s explanations about the sources of their intuitive judgments.
In their highly influential 1977 article, ‘Telling more than we can know: verbal
reports on mental processes’, Nisbett and Wilson reviewed hundreds of studies
that documented striking limitations in people’s ability to report about the mental
processes that give rise to their intuitive judgments (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977).
While people are able to state the outcomes of judgment processes, they have very
little ability to introspectively identify the intervening judgments and inferences that
played a role in producing judgment outputs.
For example, in one study, Nisbett and Wilson presented passersby at a com-
mercial establishment with four identical pairs of pantyhose, where the hose were
always arranged in a left to right sequence. Participants were then asked which
item was of best quality, and, after announcing their choice, they were then asked
why they had chosen as they had. There was a pronounced position effect with the
rightmost item chosen by a 4:1 margin over the leftmost item. But when asked why
they had chosen as they had, only one participant (out of hundreds) spontaneously
mentioned the position of the item in the array as influencing her judgment. Most
participants cited some other superficially salient attribute of the pantyhose, such
as knit strength, elasticity, or sheerness, as being the crucial variable that drove
their judgments, despite the fact that all the pantyhose were in fact identical. In
another set of studies, Latane and Darley (1970) investigated participants’ reactions
to a person (actually a confederate in the study) who appeared to be in serious
distress. The experimenters systematically manipulated the number of bystanders
(also study confederates) present. Results showed highly reliable effects that helping
behavior substantially diminished as the number of bystanders increased. But exten-
sive probing revealed that participants were consistently unaware of the effect the
number of bystanders was exerting on their choices to help. Instead, participants
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routinely cited superficially salient features of the situation to explain why they did
not help.
Based on their review of prior studies, Nisbett and Wilson identified two factors
that play a central role in why people routinely misidentify which are the critical
features of a situation that influence their intuitive judgments: 1) the actual critical
features that drive judgment are often low in salience and the influences of these
features on judgment processes are not easily accessible to conscious awareness; and
2) there is some other feature of the situation that is high in salience and that is more
readily accessible to awareness. When these two conditions are present, people tend
to ‘Tell more than they can know’ about the causes of their intuitive judgments.
That is, they ignore the importance of the low salience feature, and instead identify
the high salience feature as the cause of their intuitive judgment. We believe that
both these ‘conditions for misattribution’ are present in the Chairman case, and may
help explain why philosophers have focused on normative factors in explanations
for asymmetric intentionality judgments in the Chairman case.
Deep Self variables may be underemphasized in explanations of the Chairman
asymmetry because these variables are relatively low in salience, and a large lit-
erature in social psychology about spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) supports
this claim (see Uleman et al., 2008 for a review). STIs are attributions of atti-
tudes, values, and traits that occur implicitly during the course of observing others’
behavior. Social psychologists have shown that STIs occur ubiquitously, when-
ever trait-relevant information about others’ behavior is presented, automatically,
without the need for conscious initiation or control, and implicitly, with minimal
conscious awareness or accessibility. We believe it is plausible that in studies of
the Chairman case, when participants are presented with written descriptions of
the Chairman’s behavior, they automatically make STIs directed at the Chairman
about his values and attitudes towards the environment and his propensity to bring
about type-similar outcomes in the future. However, since these STIs proceed
implicitly, the fact that they are making these inferences is not very salient to
participants.
In contrast, normative variables may be overemphasized in explanations of
the Chairman Asymmetry because these variables are very high in salience. It is
noteworthy that there is one respect in which both the Good/Bad Model and
Moral Status Model are absolutely correct: these models are right that people do
in fact make profoundly different normative judgments in the two versions of the
Chairman case. Indeed, one the strongest effects between measured variables we
detected in our entire study is the influence between the case manipulation and
Goodness/Badness Judgments (Figure 1 and Figure 3). Moreover, these normative
judgments are directed towards a Chairman who expresses contempt for the
environment. Thus it is highly plausible that these normative judgments are
associated with strong affect and high levels of arousal, making them highly salient
and readily accessible to conscious awareness.
We can sum up the conclusions of this section of the paper in terms of a
distinction between two different kinds of intuitive judgments. People not only
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have first-order content intuitions about the Chairman case (i.e. intuitions about
whether the Chairman brought about the outcome intentionally in the Harm
and Help conditions), they also form second-order intuitive judgments about
what features of the cases their (first-order) intuitions track. Moreover, the results
of our second study suggest these second-order intuitive ‘tracking judgments’ are
highly inaccurate. People think their intuitions are tracking normative differences
in the two versions of the case, but their intuitions actually track Deep Self
variables. We propose inaccuracies in tracking judgments in the Chairman case
arise because of a more general phenomenon: people have only limited abilities to
introspectively identify the sources of their intuitions and they are highly susceptible
to the biasing effects of salience and accessibility. In short, when asked to identify
what features of cases their intuitions track, people often ‘Tell more than they
can know’.
3. The ‘Critical Features Problem’ and the Role of Structural Modeling
Methods in Philosophical Theorizing
In the previous section, we argued that people’s tracking judgments in the Chair-
man case are highly inaccurate. But difficulties in figuring out what features of
a case one’s intuitions track is by no means restricted to the Chairman case, but
rather are routinely confronted during the course of theorizing in other philo-
sophical domains. Let us use the term ‘critical features problem’ to refer to the
problem of figuring out which among the myriad features present in hypothet-
ical cases are the critical ones that our intuitions are responsive to. In this final
part of the paper, we argue that, structural path modeling (and related statisti-
cal techniques which we refer to collectively as ‘structural modeling methods’) may
be particularly useful as a tool for philosophers in addressing the critical fea-
tures problem. In particular, we argue that structural modeling methods have
significant advantages over both ‘armchair’ methods commonly used by traditional
philosophers, as well as basic survey methods commonly used by experimental
philosophers.
Let us begin by getting a deeper sense of what the critical features problem is
and why it represents an important problem for philosophical inquiry. It is widely
accepted that intuitions about hypothetical cases play a central role in philosophical
theory construction. But it is less well appreciated that intuitions about hypothetical
cases, by themselves, are often not very helpful as they are only the rawest form of data.
In order for intuitions about hypothetical cases to be useful as data or inputs into
philosophical theorizing, the theorist must often clarify, among the myriad features
present in hypothetical cases, which are the critical ones that are the sources of her intuitive
reactions.
We can readily see this point if we reflect for a moment on well known thought
experiments in the history of philosophy. Consider for example Edmund Gettier’s
famous counter-example to the ‘justified, true belief’ analysis of knowledge (Gettier,
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1963).21 Gettier described a hypothetical case in which a man named Smith believes
a certain proposition p, and the belief appears to be fully justified. In addition, p is
true, but in the circumstances described by Gettier, p’s being true arises almost
entirely by sheer coincidence. So even though Smith’s belief that p is justified
and true, we intuitively feel that Smith does not know that p. Gettier’s point in
presenting this case is not to simply notice and catalog the contents of our intuitions
in this individual case, and then stop there. Rather, Gettier uses this case to advance
a much more general thesis about what our intuitions about knowledge do or do not
track. In particular, Gettier advances the thesis that our intuitions about knowledge
cannot simply be tracking the presence of justification, truth, and belief, as these
features are in fact present in the case. Therefore it follows that there must be some
other critical feature(s) that our intuitions are tracking. The pattern of reasoning used
in Gettier’s counter-example is by no means unique. That is, it is a widespread and
well-accepted practice in philosophy to use intuitions about hypothetical cases as a
basis to infer more general theses about which are the critical features our intuitions
do or do not track. Thus the critical features problem is an important problem in
philosophy, and methods that help philosophers solve this problem can contribute
to success in philosophical inquiry.
There are some cases in which it may be relatively easy to identify which are
the critical features of hypothetical cases our intuitions are responsive to. But there
are also some important cases that are much like the Chairman case where the
critical features our intuitions track are more obscure and difficult to recognize.
For example, Peter Singer (Singer, 1972) famously observed that if we encounter
a small child about to drown in a shallow pond, we intuitively feel that we are
morally obligated to rescue the endangered child. However, when many, many
more small children are imperiled in a famine in Bangladesh, we (that is, we who
are observing the famine from a distance) do not intuitively feel that we are morally
obligated to rescue these endangered Bangladeshi children, or at least, we feel the
pull of this intuition much more weakly. Here, it is not at all obvious why our
intuitive reactions diverge in the two cases, so much so that sustained efforts have
been devoted by other philosophers in chasing down what is the crucial difference
(for example, see Unger, 1996).
The standard ‘armchair’ method that philosophers utilize to solve the critical
features problem is the ‘the method of dissociation’. In order to identify whether
our intuitions track some feature F versus some feature G, one can systemat-
ically construct hypothetical cases that dissociate these two features. That is,
one can construct cases in which F is present but G is not, and cases in
21 There is a sophisticated philosophical literature on the proper way to formalize the argu-
mentative structure of Gettier’s thought experiment (Williamson, 2007; Pust, Unpublished
Manuscript). Our discussion is compatible with a number of different formalization strate-
gies, and we use an intuitive characterization of the structure of Gettier’s argument in what
follows.
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which G is present while F is not. By checking one’s intuitive reactions to
this overall set of cases, it can often be discerned whether our intuitions track
F versus G.
While the method of dissociation is often effective, and it is certainly deployed
adeptly by philosophers, the method is not infallible and indeed may have serious
limitations in some cases. In particular, the method of dissociation is conspicuously
less effective when two or more features are highly correlated across a range of
hypothetical cases. In this circumstance, it may be difficult to construct plausible
hypothetical cases in which these correlated features are truly dissociated. For
example, it may hard to find plausible cases that cleanly and completely pull apart the
notion of rightness associated with deontological theories versus utilitarian theories
(especially rule utilitarian theories), even though the features these theories claim
our intuitions track are indeed quite different. This problem of correlated features is
compounded by the issue of salience. Recall from our discussion of the psychological
literature on subjective reports on mental processes, the underlying psychological
processes that cause our intuitions to track particular features of hypothetical cases
are often implicit, and the features these intuitions track may be of low salience.
Furthermore, other features of hypothetical cases may be much higher in salience.
When correlated features of hypothetical cases differ in salience, people’s intuitive
judgments about what features of cases their intuitions track may become highly
inaccurate. That is, there may be a very strong tendency to ‘Tell more than we
can know’ and erroneously identify the more salient features as being the ones that
drive intuitions. For these reasons, the method of dissociation is not always effective
and there is a need to develop additional approaches for solving the critical features
problem that go beyond what armchair methods can deliver.
Experimental philosophers frequently criticize armchair methods of philosophical
theorizing as being ineffective or unreliable. But with regard to the critical features
problem specifically, it is not at all clear how typical methods used by experimental
philosophers represent much of an improvement over armchair methods. The vast
majority of experimental studies by philosophers investigating the Chairman case
(though by no means all!) have used basic survey methods that count and compare
the number of people who make one kind of intuitive judgment versus another.
Surveys such as these can clearly be useful for some purposes (for example, to
document that there is variability within or across cultures in philosophically-
relevant intuitions). But in cases such as the Chairman case where our primary
interest is in finding out the sources or causes of our intuitions, basic survey methods
are less helpful. These surveys can only document that asymmetric judgments of
intentionality are observed, but they cannot explain what causes this asymmetry.
If the results of a survey show that more people think the Chairman intentionally
harmed the environment in the harm condition than helped the environment in
the help condition, the experimenter still has to figure out what features of the
case generated this asymmetric pattern of intuitions. So the experimenter is still
confronted with the problem that it is quite hard to introspectively identify the
sources of one’s intuitions, and quite easy to fall prey to biasing effects of factors
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with high salience and high accessibility. Thus, the use of basic survey methods
appears to offer little help in solving the critical features problem.
In contrast to basic survey methods, which do not appear to add much to standard
armchair methods as a means to address the critical features problem, structural
modeling methods of the kind utilized in our study of the Chairman case do deliver
important information that is not accessible from the armchair. Structural modeling
methods work by taking advantage of natural patterns of variation in intuitive
judgments across a very large number (typically hundreds) of people in order to
arrive at conclusions that are not easily accessible to any one of those persons taken
alone. For example, in the Chairman case, suppose one person makes an intuitive
judgment about whether the Chairman intentionally brought about the outcome,
as well as a normative judgment about the goodness or badness of this outcome.
That lone person would be very hard-pressed to say with any confidence whether
the judgment of intentionality is being causally driven by the goodness/badness
judgment, or whether these two judgments simply co-occur without the former
being directly causally influenced by the latter. But if we assemble hundreds of
people together, the aggregate will exhibit patterns of variation with respect to
each of these judgments. That is, people will differ on how strongly they feel
that that the Chairman intentionally brought about the outcome, and people will
differ on how good or bad they rate the outcome brought about by the Chairman.
By analyzing these naturally occurring patterns of variation across hundreds of
people with structural modeling, we can often gain valuable evidence for whether
one judgment is causally driving the other or whether the two judgments merely
co-occur. Based on this kind of evidence, we can form more reliable assessments of
whether intuitions about intentionality track the goodness or badness of outcomes,
or whether intuitions about intentionality track other features (such as Deep Self-
related features) that are often correlated with the goodness or badness of outcomes.
Thus quantitative methods such as structural modeling provide a powerful means
for addressing the critical features problem, a means that is quite distinct from, and in
some ways goes significantly beyond, what can be accomplished from the armchair.
One of the most common complaints heard about the use of experimental
methods in philosophy starts with the observation that experimental methods study
the intuitions of ordinary people. Then, the question is posed, ‘Why should we
care about the intuitions of ordinary folk? Since philosophers seek to construct
reflective theories in which ordinary opinions are critically scrutinized and frequently
revised, why will simply polling the opinions of ordinary folk contribute much
to philosophical inquiry?’ This ‘Who cares about the folk?’ objection may have
some bite when directed at the basic survey methods discussed earlier that seek to
count and compare the number of people that have one intuition versus another
(though how much bite it actually carries is open for debate). But the ‘Who cares
about the folk’ objection wholly misses the mark when directed against structural
modeling methods. The point of structural modeling is not to simply catalog the
contents of ordinary people’s intuitions, or to quantify the number of people who
have one intuition versus another. Rather, the point is to illuminate underlying
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causal relationships between various implicit judgment processes that play a role
in producing philosophically-relevant intuitions. By helping us to identify which
among a number of potential factors do or do not contribute to the formation of
intuitive judgments, these experimental methods help solve the problem of figuring
out what features of hypothetical cases our intuitions track. It is precisely when
we are aware of the features our intuitions track that we are able to reflectively
criticize whether these intuitions are warranted, and whether these intuitions should
carry weight in a mature philosophical account. Thus quantitative methods such as
structural modeling do not seek to substitute the reflective opinions of philosophers
with the untutored opinions of laypeople. Rather, by illuminating underlying
tracking relationships, these quantitative methods serve as a tool for advancing
philosophers’ own reflective agendas.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we challenged a widely held view among philosophers that normative
considerations influence judgments of intentionality. We conducted a study of
people’s intuitions in the Chairman case, one of the most influential in the
philosophical literature, using a statistical method called structural path modeling. The
results of our study showed that people’s attributions of intentional action to an
agent are not primarily driven by their normative assessments, but are instead mainly
driven by assessments of the underlying values and characterological dispositions of
the agent, as predicted by the alternative Deep Self Concordance Model. In a second
study, we examined people’s judgments about what they think drives asymmetric
intuitions in the Chairman case and found that people are highly inaccurate in
identifying which features of the case their intuitions track. Invoking the work of
Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson from their famous paper ‘Telling more than
we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes’, we argued that people’s tracking
judgments are inaccurate because these judgments are often inappropriately biased
by factors such as salience and accessibility. We then discussed the ways in which
structural path modeling can supplement existing methods used by philosophers,
including existing methods used by experimental philosophers, in helping to solve
the critical features problem—the problem of figuring out which among the
myriad features present in hypothetical cases are the critical ones our intuitions are
responsive to. Thus, structural path modeling and related techniques may serve as
an important new additional tool for philosophers that can complement existing
methods of philosophical inquiry.
C. Sripada, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and
Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
S. Konrath, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and
Department of Psychiatry, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
376 C. Sripada and S. Konrath
Appendix A: Testing Nadelhoffer’s ‘Interaction Model’
In a series of publications (Nadelhoffer, 2004a and b, 2006), Thomas Nadelhoffer
has put forward an intriguing model for explaining asymmetries in intentionality
judgments in cases such as the Chairman case. While we did not have Nadelhoffer’s
model in mind when we designed the present study, the data we collected did
allow us to perform an additional test of his model, and we report the results in
this appendix section. Nadelhoffer’s model of intentionality judgments incorporates
elements of the Moral Status Model and the Good/Bad Model (and an important
feature of the Deep Self Concordance Model as well). In agreement with the Moral
Status Model, Nadelhoffer believes that seeing an agent behave in an immoral way
biases people’s judgments of intentionality. But unlike the Moral Status Model,
Nadelhoffer contends that the Chairman asymmetry doesn’t arise because people
view the Chairman as more immoral in the harm condition and less immoral in the
help condition (though he doesn’t explicitly deny that this may be the case). Rather,
he focuses on the observation that people will tend to view the Chairman as more
immoral than moral in both the harm and the help condition. This is because the
Chairman expresses contempt and hostility towards the environment both when he
actually harms it (in the harm condition), and also when he says he doesn’t care at
all about helping it (in the help condition). Additionally, Nadelhoffer puts forward
the idea that moral status judgments of the agent interact with the evaluative valence
of the outcome that the agent brings about, which is why we dub his model the
‘Interaction Model’. According to this model, if an agent is judged to be immoral,
then people are biased to judge that the bad outcomes the agent brings about are
intentional, but the good outcomes the agent brings about are not intentional. The
Interaction Model thus contains the idea that intentionality judgments depend,
at least in part, on the presence of concordance between the moral valence
assigned to the agent and the evaluative valence assigned to the outcome, and
in this respect this model has some similarities with the Deep Self Concordance
Model.
To test the Interaction Model, we computed an additional variable that represents
the magnitude of the difference (i.e. the absolute value of the difference) between
each participant’s ratings of the Moral Status of the Chairman (Question 3) and the
Goodness/Badness of the outcome (Question 2), and we refer to this additional
variable as the ‘MSGB’ variable. The MSGB variable represents the concordance
between the moral valence assigned to the agent and the evaluative valence assigned
to the outcome. The Interaction Model predicts that the MSGB variable will
take lower values in the harm condition than the help condition (there is greater
concordance between the evaluative valence of the agent and the outcome in the
harm condition than the help condition because in the harm condition, typically,
the Chairman is judged to be very immoral and the outcome is judged to be very
bad), and that this variable will predict intentionally judgments. One way to test the
Interaction Model is simply to place the MSGB variable in the original structural
path model presented in Figure 1 alongside our other candidate mediator variables.
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Figure 4 Structural path model of candidate mediators of the relationship between the case manipulation
and judgments of intentional action in the Chairman case. Statistically significant paths are shown as
solid arrows, while non-significant paths are shown as dashed arrows. ∗ = p < 0.05, ∗∗ = p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ = p < 0.001
However, since the MSGB variable is directly derived from the Moral Status
Judgments and Goodness/Badness Judgments variables, putting all three normative
variables in the same model results in unacceptably high levels of intercorrelations
between the predictor variables in model (i.e. the problem of ‘multicollinearity’).
To avoid this problem, we entered the MSGB variable in a new model from
which the Goodness/Badness Judgments and Moral Status Judgments variables
were omitted, and performed a new structural path analysis of the relationships
between the variables in this new model.
This new structural path model (Figure 4) exhibits ‘acceptable’ fit with the data,22
and modification indices (see footnotes 11 and 12) do not identify additional paths
for which there is statistical evidence that these paths should be added or removed
from the model. In this new model, Case is a highly significant predictor of
MSGB Judgments, but the MSGB Judgments → Intentionality Judgments path reaches
only trend level statistical significance (p = 0.065). Furthermore, the model shows
that MSBG Judgments are only a weak predictor of Intentionality Judgments.
22 X2(3, N = 240) = 9.54, p = 0.02; NFI = .986; NNFI = .967; CFI = .990; RMSEA = .095.
Using ‘rule of thumb’ cutoff values for the RMSEA (Hu and Bentler, 1999), the model displays
‘acceptable’ overall fit with the data.
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That is, the size of the path connecting these two variables is relatively small
compared to the paths connecting Deep Self variables to Intentionality Judgments.
Mediation analysis shows that 9% of the effect of Case on Intentionality Judgments
is mediated through MSBG Judgments. We conclude from this additional analysis
that the normative factor identified in Nadelhoffer’s model may indeed contribute
to Intentionality Judgments, but the size of the effect of this factor is likely to be
fairly small. Moreover, our overall conclusion from Part I of the paper—that Deep
Self variables explain the majority of the asymmetry effect in the Chairman case
and normative variables explain a much smaller portion of the effect—remains fully
supported.
Appendix B

















0.732 2.74 0.389 3.581
Generalizability −0.707 −2.542 −0.35 −2.275 3.814
Intentionality −0.703 −2.381 −0.456 −2.572 2.51 4.46
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